Is This Really You? An Empirical Study on Risk-Based Authentication
  Applied in the Wild by Wiefling, Stephan et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
07
62
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
7 M
ar 
20
20
Is This Really You? An Empirical Study on
Risk-Based Authentication Applied in the Wild
Stephan Wiefling1, Luigi Lo Iacono1, and Markus Du¨rmuth2
1 TH Ko¨ln - University of Applied Sciences, Cologne, Germany
{stephan.wiefling, luigi.lo iacono}@th-koeln.de
2 Ruhr University Bochum, Germany markus.duermuth@rub.de
Abstract. Risk-based authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security mea-
sure to strengthen password-based authentication. RBA monitors addi-
tional implicit features during password entry such as device or geolo-
cation information, and requests additional authentication factors if a
certain risk level is detected. RBA is recommended by the NIST digital
identity guidelines, is used by several large online services, and offers pro-
tection against security risks such as password database leaks, credential
stuffing, insecure passwords and large-scale guessing attacks. Despite its
relevance, the procedures used by RBA-instrumented online services are
currently not disclosed. Consequently, there is little scientific research
about RBA, slowing down progress and deeper understanding, making
it harder for end users to understand the security provided by the services
they use and trust, and hindering the widespread adoption of RBA.
In this paper, with a series of studies on eight popular online services, we
(i) analyze which features and combinations/classifiers are used and are
useful in practical instances, (ii) develop a framework and a methodology
to measure RBA in the wild, and (iii) survey and discuss the differences
in the user interface for RBA. Following this, our work provides a first
deeper understanding of practical RBA deployments and helps fostering
further research in this direction.
1 Introduction
Weaknesses in password-based authentication have been known for a long time
[21]. They range from weak and easy to guess passwords [4, 29] or password
re-use [9] to being susceptible to phishing attacks. Still, passwords are the pre-
dominant authentication mechanism deployed by online services today [6, 23].
To increase the users’ security, service operators should implement additional
measures. Two-factor authentication (2FA) [22] is one widely offered measure
that improves account security, but is rather unpopular (e.g. in January 2018,
less than 10 % of active Google accounts used 2FA [19]). Risk-based authenti-
cation (RBA) [11] is an approach that increases security with minimal impact
on user interaction, and thus has the potential to provide secure authentication
with good usability. It is among the approaches suggested by the NIST digital
identity guidelines to mitigate online guessing attacks [14].
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Risk-based Authentication (RBA) RBA is typically used in addition to
passwords or other forms of user authentication. It is designed to protect against
a rather strong attacker that either knows the correct credentials (i.e., user-
name / password pair) or can guess correct credentials with a low number of
guesses. Examples include credential stuffing attacks [30] where an attacker tries
credentials leaked from another service, phishing attackers, or online guessing
attacks [29]. During password entry RBA monitors and records additional fea-
tures that are contextually available. In principle, a number of various distinct
features can be taken into account (see Table 1), including the IP address and
derived features such as geolocation or country, and the user agent [5, 11]. Some
features are better suited for risk assessment than others: The IP address, e.g.,
could be rated as “more important” than the user agent string since spoofing an
IP address is considered as more difficult than the latter [3].
From these features a risk score is calculated. It is then typically classified
into three buckets (low, medium and high risk) [11, 20, 16]. Depending on the risk
score and its classification, a variety of actions can be performed by the service.
When a risk score exceeds e.g. the low threshold and falls into the medium risk
category, the service typically requests additional authentication factors from
the user (e.g. verification of email address or phone number [17, 24, 11]), requires
to solve a CAPTCHA [24], or informs the user about suspicious activities [13]. If
the risk score is deemed high, the service can decide to block access altogether,
but this event is rare, as it will not allow legitimate users mistakenly classified
as a high risk to recover. The thresholds of when a user becomes suspicious have
to be carefully chosen for each individual RBA use case scenario.
Contribution We investigate how RBA is used on eight high-traffic online
services (Amazon, Facebook, GOG.com, Google, iCloud, LinkedIn, Steam and
Twitch). We created 28 virtual identities and 224 user accounts for this purpose.
During a period of 3.5 months we conducted studies to determine (an approx-
imation to) a set of features that contributes to the risk score computation,
and studied the influence of these features. We also captured and analyzed the
deployed additional authentication factors. Our studies revealed serious vulner-
abilities emphasizing the need for an open discussion on RBA in science.
To achieve reliable and repeatable results, we developed an automated browser
testing framework and simulated human-like user behavior with individual activ-
ities on each of the online services. The framework contains enhanced technical
camouflage measures to be indistinguishable from human users. The developed
testing framework3 can be used to analyze black boxed services for RBA features.
Our work is intended to support both research and development. Researchers
benefit from an increased transparency on the current practice of RBA deploy-
ment. Also, they obtain a test methodology and tooling for running replication
or follow-up studies. Developers obtain guided insights on how to best create or
improve own RBA implementations. The same is true for administrators aiming
at integrating RBA as an additional line of defense in their online services. This
3 Provided as open source software at https://github.com/DASCologne/HOSIT
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all contributes to an open scientific discussion on RBA, ultimately leading to a
comprehensively understood security measure, leaving no room for obscurities.
We hope that public research on RBA will enable a broader adoption of RBA
and thus protect a larger user base, while currently only larger online services
are capable to offer RBA techniques (beyond very basic and inaccurate service).
Outline The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related
work. Section 3 describes the developed automated testing framework, created
identities and prerequisites for the studies. The study setup and obtained results
are described in Section 4. We discuss findings and limitations in Section 5 and
conclude with the main contributions and an outlook on future work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
The features and authentication factors deployed by RBA-instrumented online
services are currently either not disclosed or just briefly mentioned by the respec-
tive companies [19, 17, 18]. This lack hinders any scientific debate and rigorous
analysis to facilitate the effective and open use of RBA. These debates and anal-
yses are even more important today since RBA is recommended by NIST [14]
and therefore becoming a requirement for many IT security professionals.
Most of the RBA-related research is focused on evaluating the reliability and
robustness of certain features. A RBA method based on mouse and keyboard
dynamics was developed and tested by Traore et al. [27]. Judging from the
observed equal error rate, they concluded that this method is not suitable for
RBA inside the login process. Hurkala and Hurkala [16] published a software
architecture of a RBA system. The features IP address, login time, availability
of cookie, device profiling and failed login attempts are implemented in the RBA
system. The limitations and effectiveness of these features were not estimated.
Freeman et al. [11] presented the, to the best of our knowledge, first publicly
known RBA algorithm using IP address and user agent as features. Steinegger et
al. [26] presented another RBA implementation, with browser fingerprint, failed
login attempts and IP based geolocation as features. Alaca and van Oorschot
[3] classified and rated 29 distinct methods for device fingerprinting regarding
possible “distinguishing info”. They rated IP address and geolocation as “high”.
Daud et al. [10] introduced an adaptive authentication method applying HTML5
canvas fingerprinting. The effectiveness of this method is unclear due to the lack
of testing with participants. Herley and Schechter [15] presented a method for
authentication servers to distinguish attacks from legitimate traffic. They rated
the password used for a failed attempt as a strong feature to identify attacks.
Petsas et al. [22] estimated the quantity of Google user accounts with enabled
2FA functionality. They used headless browser automation with enhancements
for user simulation. Their methodology, using browser automation and observing
reactions, is roughly similar to ours. However, due to the complex nature of RBA
and novel browser automation detection methods [28], a considerably higher
amount of effort was necessary in our studies.
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3 Black Box Testing RBA
In this section we introduce the developed approach for black box testing RBA
implementations in the wild. The basic methodology is to create accounts on the
inspected online services and to observe the behavior when accessing the service
using these accounts for a variety of scenarios. This seemingly simple procedure
is complicated by a number of factors: (i) The account’s login history may in-
fluence the risk score. Thus, testing multiple scenarios with the same account
may produce unreliable results. (ii) Automated testing is likely influencing the
outcome, as one of the tasks of RBA is specifically to detect bots. (iii) The
list of features that potentially may be used by online services to determine
the risk score is vast, and simply testing all combinations is next to impossi-
ble. (iv) Depending on the service’s implementation of RBA, the feedback can
be coarse-grained, i.e., giving mostly binary information (RBA triggered/not
triggered), while other online services provide more fine-grained information.
Our approach considers these issues and mitigates their effects on the results.
We created a larger number of virtual identities and spent several weeks to train
them on legitimate behavior. The data collection uses an extensively patched
version of Chromium and a careful planning to protect against detection.
3.1 Creation of Identities
We created 28 identities for our studies. User accounts for all eight inspected on-
line services were created with each identity. We used a random identity genera-
tor for identity creation. Each identity consisted of first and last name, birthday,
gender (50% male, 50% female), job title (function, company) as well as typing
speed. Each identity owns an individual IP address (geolocation: TH Ko¨ln) and
a personal computer (virtual machine running Ubuntu Linux 16.04 LTS). We
conducted a one month pilot phase with one identity in order to optimize our
identity creation, training and testing automation. Afterwards, we started the
automated training and testing with the remaining 27 identities. The account
creation for Facebook required some extra care, as RBA is not activated per se
for all accounts [17]. We manually conducted extra training to these accounts
(e.g. friend requests) prior to the studies. Resulting of the higher effort, 14 Face-
book accounts (5 male, 9 female) were created. Six accounts (4 male, 2 female)
were suspended during training because of “suspicious” activities. Since female
accounts had higher success rates in terms of accepted friend requests or mes-
sages, we preferred them in Facebook account creation. Thus, in total we created
224 accounts of which 210 remained available for training and 204 for inspecting
the targeted online services.
3.2 Training of Identities
Each online service was trained with individual user activities for each identity
in a 3.5 month period between December 2017 and March 2018. Each identity
executed 20 user sessions lasting between 1.5 and 2 hours within a training
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period of 2 or 4 weeks. The start of the browsing sessions varied randomly
between two time spans (9:00 - 9:30 AM, 1:00 - 1:30 PM) to mitigate possible
automation detection by the online services. For further mitigation, the identities
were created iteratively in small batches of three to four identities per week.
We developed individual automated user activities for each online service.
Activities include the login process, actions on the online services at logged in
state (user action) and the logout process. In the login process, our user opens
the targeted online service in a new browser tab, enters its login credentials and
accesses this service. We considered typical user activities for the user actions,
e.g. scrolling in the news feed or browsing on the online service. These actions
included randomness and fine-grained variations to avoid being spotted as a
“scripted human”. Also, the user behavior differed between genders. For the
logout, our user logs out of the online service and closes the tab.
We simulated browsing activities on other websites in separate tabs, as online
services may track this browsing behavior [7]. Users visited a search engine and
looked for current events in local media. They followed some of the links in the
search results and “read” the website’s content by scrolling and waiting.
These activities were conducted inside browsing sessions. Each session was
initiated with an empty browser history including cookies and local cache. The
cookies were retained inside each browsing session. Afterwards, the testing se-
quence of online services was shuffled to a random order. We did this to prevent
that our user logs into online services at the same time throughout the study.
3.3 Implementation of RBA Inspection System
The implemented RBA inspection system is based on the browser Chromium
64.0.3253.3. For browsing automation, the library Puppeteer 0.13.0 is used. The
obtained observations during the test phase are stored in a MongoDB log.
Chromium was operated in a custom headful mode (browser is launched with
visible graphical user interface inside a virtual window session). We used the
headful mode to avoid detection of our automated browsing. When Chromium
is executed in headless mode, which is specifically designed for browsing automa-
tion, a number of differences in Chromium’s behavior allow websites to detect
the automation mode [28]. In fact, during pilot testing we experienced situations
in which inspected online services treated a browser in headless mode differently.
Furthermore, we modified the Chromium source code to minimize possible
detection of our automated RBA inspection system.
We implemented the user automation framework using Puppeteer, a library
to control Chromium. We found that several of the provided automation func-
tions can be detected by online services. The constant delay in the standard
Puppeteer key typing function is used to detect automated input. We there-
fore modified and enhanced several Puppeteer library functions to mimic human
behavior more closely: (i) We added randomized delays between pressing and
releasing key buttons as well as consecutive button presses. (ii) We adjusted the
default mouse input behavior of clicking on the exact center of a specified element
by selecting a random click point in the center quarter of the element. Moreover,
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Table 1: Comparison of possible RBA features (bold: selected for the studies)
Feature RBA references Distinguishing
(except [3]) info [3]
IP address# [11, 12, 8, 2, 16, 26] High
User agent string [11, 16, 25] High*
Language [11, 16, 8] High*
Display resolution [10, 25] High*
Login time [11, 16, 12, 25, 8] Low+
Evercookies [16] Very high
Canvas fingerprinting [10, 20, 26] Medium
Mouse and keystroke dynamics [27] - (Low for scroll wheel fingerprinting)
Failed login attempts [16, 26] -
WebRTC - Medium
Counting hosts behind NAT - Low
Ad blocker detection - Very low
# Includes IP based geolocation.
* Refers to major software and hardware details
+ Refers to system time and clock drift. Alaca and van Oorschot did not consider the login
time. Hurkala and Hurkala [16] estimated a medium risk level for unusual login times.
the default time between pressing and releasing the mouse button of zero was
replaced with a more realistic randomized click time. (iii) We implemented a
scrolling function to imitate human-like reading of website contents.
We integrated external services providing CAPTCHA solving capabilities in
order to allow our RBA inspection system to operate fully automated.
3.4 Inspection of RBA Features
A wide variety of features can be used for RBA deployments, ranging from
browser provided information to network information [27, 3]. To reduce com-
plexity, we selected five features based on the number of mentions in literature
and the evaluations in [3] in terms of highest “distinguishing info” (see Table 1).
We selected the features IP address, user agent string, language, login time
and display resolution for our investigations.
Canvas fingerprinting and evercookies provide a high level of information [3,
10, 1]. Canvas fingerprinting can be seen as a more robust and fine-grained version
of user agent strings. Evercookies can uniquely identify a device. Since both
features are considered as harder to fake, they add a high level of trust, possibly
bypassing RBA security mechanisms. Since we aimed to test the “uncertain”
area in terms of RBA risk scores, we did not consider both for our studies.
Prior to the study design, we estimated possible risk score results for specific
variations of feature values. We used these estimations to design the final studies.
Since no public information on the analyzed RBA implementations was known,
we considered three publications [11, 16, 8] as a baseline for the estimation. We
made use of the maximum possible range of ratings. However, since IP addresses
are considered as more spoofing resistant than the other features [3], we expect
this feature to be weighted highest inside the black box RBA implementations.
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We assume that the IP address risk score increases with both geographical
distance towards the usual values and changes in IP address and internet service
provider (ISP). Since users are more likely moving in their current region, we
expect the risk score to be medium at a maximum inside the same country.
We assume changes in continents to be more unusual, so we expect a high risk
score in that case. We rated the risk score for IP addresses of the anonymization
service Tor as unknown for two reasons: (i) Tor exit nodes (and Tor users)
can be identified through a public list. Thus, one publication [16] estimated a
high risk score for Tor. (ii) Facebook explicitly supports Tor. Hence, lower risk
scores can also be possible. We subdivided the user agent string into browser,
operating system (OS) and version. We expect users to switch browsers more
likely than the OS, which is why we weighted browser changes lower than those
in the OS. For the remaining three features, we assume that changes in one or
more parameters will increase the score equally.
4 Studies
In this section, we describe the setup and results of the studies we conducted
to evaluate the eight analyzed online services for their RBA behavior. We con-
ducted two studies. In the first one, we tested how the online services reacted to
six different variations of IP addresses to reduce the number of required test con-
ditions for the second study (see Section 4.1). In the second and main study we
then determined which of the five investigated features (see Table 1) play a role
in RBA decision-making (see Section 4.2). We tested all possible combinations
of these features for each online service and observed the results. We did this to
determine whether a certain feature was included in the online service’s feature
set and to ascertain how a particular feature was weighted in the online service’s
RBA decision-making. Finally, we also did several activities on user accounts
so that online services might offer diverse selections of additional authentication
factors. We did this to capture as many additional authentication factors applied
by the targeted online services as possible (see Section 4.3). An extended version
of our results including all captured dialogs can be found online [31].
4.1 Study 1: Determining IP Feature Thresholds
The feature space that can be used for RBA is huge, and even with the restric-
tions put forth in Section 3.4 the search space is still too large for the type of
study we envision. Even the particularly important IP address feature has a wide
range of possible values. Possibly interesting variations range from dynamic IPs
(same ISP, same geolocation) or different access points (work, home, mobile)
at similar locations, to national or international travelling or Tor (see Table 2).
Thus, in a first step we treated the IP space separately and tried to find thresh-
olds for the individual online services that are close to the decision boundary
of the decision procedure. This will simplify the subsequent experiments and
reduce the number of required probes.
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Methodology In this first study varied the IP address only. We equipped seven
of the trained identities with new IP addresses (Table 2). Probe 0 uses the iden-
tical IP from which the online services were trained before. Probe 1 and probe
2 are located in close vicinity of the training IP (same city, physical distance
less than 1 km), where probe 1 is from the same ISP (a university) and probe
2 is from a different ISP. Probes 3 to 5 used IPs with an increasing distance
from the training origin. We used VPN tunnels through Amazon Web Services
(AWS) instances for these probes. Probe 6 used the Tor network, with an IP
of the exit node that is potentially known by service providers and sometimes
treated differently. Logins at all online services were conducted with the new IP
address and reactions of the online services were recorded.
Results The obtained results are depicted in Table 3. We see that the thresh-
olds seem to be at IP variation probe 4 (Google, Amazon, LinkedIn) and probe 1
(GOG.com). Facebook, Steam, Twitch and iCloud did not request additional au-
thentication factors, if only the IP address was varied. A CAPTCHA inside the
Steam login form was visible in probe 6 (Tor). A reCAPTCHA on the Twitch lo-
gin form was not displayed in probe 2 (Netcologne) while being visible vice versa.
These might rather be signs for blacklisting (Steam) or whitelisting (Twitch)
than for RBA. Google sent an email containing a security alert on two occasions
before reaching the threshold of asking for additional authentication factors.
Based on the results, we extracted three IP settings for use in the subsequent
experiments. These were selected for each online service separately, reflecting
the determined thresholds. We set probe 0 (TH Ko¨ln) for GOG.com, probe 3
(Frankfurt) for Google, Amazon and LinkedIn as well as probe 5 (Oregon) for
Facebook, Steam, Twitch and iCloud. We did not use Tor in subsequent studies,
due to its unpredictable nature (frequent variations of IP addresses) which could
produce unreliable results. Varying the ISP to AWS (probe 3) inside the same
country did not result in requesting additional authentication factors. Hence, we
assume that using AWS IP addresses did not affect the reliability of our results.
4.2 Study 2: Examining RBA Usage
In the second and main study, we determined which features play a role in
the overall RBA decision-making and under which circumstances the inspected
online services request additional authentication factors.
Table 2: Setup of study 1 to determine the RBA triggering threshold for the IP
feature
IP ISP Geolocation Description
probe 0 fixed TH Ko¨ln Cologne, Germany same IP as used during training
probe 1 fresh TH Ko¨ln Cologne, Germany fresh IP in the same building
probe 2 fresh Netcologne Cologne, Germany different provider in the same city
probe 3 fresh AWS Frankfurt, Germany same country, different provider
probe 4 fresh AWS Paris, France same continent, different provider
probe 5 fresh AWS Oregon, USA different continent
probe 6 fresh random random (Tor exit node) Tor exit node at random location
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Table 3: Results of study 1 showing the determined RBA triggering thresholds
for the IP feature (bold lines).
IP variation Identity Facebook Google Amazon LinkedIn GOG.com Steam Twitch iCloud
probe 0 (TH Ko¨ln, fixed) All identities - - - - - - - -
probe 1 (TH Ko¨ln, fresh) IDA, IDAA+ - - - - A - - -
probe 2 (Netcologne) IDB - S - - A - Ø -
probe 3 (Frankfurt) IDC - S - - A - - -
probe 4 (Paris) IDD - A A A A - - -
probe 5 (Oregon) IDE - A A A A - - -
probe 6 (Tor) IDF - A A A A O - -
A: Additional authentication factors requested O: CAPTCHA displayed before login
S: Security alert submitted (via email) Ø: reCAPTCHA not displayed before login
- : No RBA triggered +: Facebook login was conducted with this identity
Methodology We tested all 31 possible combinations of the five parameters
IP address, user agent string, language, time parameters and display resolution
for triggering RBA. Each trained account conducted one or two login attempts
with different parameter combinations. The IP address was chosen one step
beneath the determined RBA triggering threshold. The remaining parameters
were chosen to represent the highest possible risk estimation as defined in Section
3.4 (see Table 4). We chose a far distance country with a different national
language than in the training country as the testing country. Based on the online
services’ behavior of all 31 parameter combinations, we are able to derive possible
feature set parameters.
Results Google sent a security alert via email when either of the features IP
address, user agent or resolution changed (see Table 5). Changes in one of the
features language and time didn’t result in a warning instead. In contrast to
that, we have seen before that strong variations of the IP address result in
a request for additional authentication factors (see Table 3). When modifying
two features, all combinations resulted in a security warning, except for the
combination of language and time. Modifying three features resulted at least
in a security warning, and the combination of IP address, user agent, and time
parameters led to an additional authentication factor requested. Concluding all
results, our derived Google feature set contains IP address (highest weighting),
time parameters (lower weighted than IP), user agent and resolution.
LinkedIn’s RBA was triggered with combinations of IP address and at least
one of the other parameters (see Table 6). Thus, LinkedIn’s feature set comprises
Table 4: Setup of study 2 showing the probed features. We tested all possible
combinations, i.e., 25 − 1 = 31 variations per online service.
Neutral/Training Testing
IP address as in training as determined in Sect 4.1
User agent Chrome/Linux Firefox/Windows 10
Languages de-DE,de,en-US,en es-MX,es,en-US,en
Time Timezone UTC+1 (Europe/Berlin) UTC-6 (Mexico/General)
Login times [UTC+1] 9:00 AM - 2:30 PM 0:00 - 1:00 AM
Display resolution 1366x768 1280x1024
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Table 5: Results of Study 2 for Google modifying a single feature (left), two
features (middle), and more than two features (right).
(A: Additional authentication factors requested, - : No RBA triggered, S: Secu-
rity alert, C: Critical security alert)
Result
IP address S
User agent S
Language -
Time -
Resolution S
IP UA L T R
IP address S S S S
User agent S S S S
Language S S - S
Time S S - S
Resolution S S S S
IP UA L T R Result
X X X S
X X X S
X X X S
X X X A/C
X X X X A/C
X X X X A/C
X X X X X A/C
Table 6: Results of Study 2 for LinkedIn modifying a single feature (left) and
two features (right).
(A: Additional authentication factors requested, - : No RBA triggered)
Result
IP address -
User agent -
Language -
Time -
Resolution -
IP UA L T R
IP address A A A A
User agent A - - -
Language A - - -
Time A - - -
Resolution A - - -
IP address, user agent, language, time parameters and resolution. The IP address
seems to be higher weighted since it triggered RBA in the prior study alone.
Facebook seems to have RBA deactivated by default. We could not trigger
RBA on accounts having at least 50 connections to other accounts (friends). How-
ever, we could trigger RBA on two female accounts having both 40-50 friends
and a high interaction rate based on received friendship requests and messages
from other users. Due to the possible dissimilarities between the test accounts
(RBA enabled or disabled), we cannot deduce the exact feature set here. How-
ever, our results show that Facebook requested additional authentication factors
when at least IP address, user agent and resolution were changed.
On Amazon and GOG.com we could not trigger RBA with more or other
parameters than the IP address. Thus, their derived feature sets contain only
the IP address of our probed features.
The remaining online services Steam, Twitch and iCloud did not show any
reaction in both studies. Possible reasons for this behavior could be: (i) RBA
was not implemented or not activated by the user behavior. (ii) Other features
than the five tested were rated as more important. (iii) An internal warning was
triggered informing operational staff about suspicious behavior.
4.3 Study 3: Analyzing Additional Authentication Factors
With RBA being triggered, additional authentication factors are requested by
the respective online service. Depending on internal account settings, online ser-
vices might vary the set of requested additional authentication factors. Overviews
of neither the additional authentication factors nor the corresponding RBA user
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Table 7: Captured additional authentication factors
(*: Authentication factor was offered in all tested parameter variations)
Service Requested authentication factors
Facebook
Approve login on another computer*
Identify photos of friends*
Asking friends for help*
Verification code (text message)
Google
Enter the city you usually sign in from
Verification code (email, text message, app, phone call)
Press confirmation button on second device (tablet, smartphone)
LinkedIn Verification code (email)*
Amazon Verification code (email*, text message)
GOG.com Verification code (email)*
interfaces in current practice were published in literature to date. For this rea-
son, we tried to capture as many variations as possible. In order to achieve this,
we added a mobile phone number, a smartphone or tablet as a second device and
did additional user actions (e.g. writing a private message with phone number
included). We triggered RBA on desktop and mobile devices with all possible
combinations and monitored the demanded authentication factors (see Table 7).
5 Discussion
According to our findings, all tested RBA-instrumented online services used the
IP address in their feature sets. Most online services also used additional features
as user agent or display resolution. All tested online services offered verification
codes as an additional authentication factor. The test results confirmed our hy-
pothesis that online services rated the IP address higher than other parameters.
Facebook’s verification code feature leaked the full phone number. We con-
sider this as a bad practice and a threat for privacy. In so doing, phone numbers
of users can be obtained. Also, attackers can call the number and gain access to
the verification code by social engineering. We are convinced that such a RBA
solution will not mitigate incentives for credential stuffing or online password
guessing attacks. Thanks to the prompt reaction by Facebook, this vulnerability
is now fixed: We contacted Facebook about the phone number leak on Septem-
ber 4th, 2018. Facebook resolved the issue on September 6th, 2018. Since this
issue seemingly remained undiscovered by Facebook before our disclosure, this
underlines the demand for more research on RBA to improve its overall security.
5.1 Derived RBA Models Applied in Practice
Based on our findings, we are able to derive three distinct types of conceptual
RBA models. Note that due to the abstract nature of these models, they do not
provide implementation details.
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The Single-Feature Model relies on a single feature only. The password
authentication process is extended to search for an exact match of the IP address
in the IP address history of the user. If there is no such match, additional au-
thentication steps are requested. We assume that GOG.com adopted this model.
This model is easy to implement, since only one feature has to be stored and
evaluated. Thus, a minimum of sensitive data has to be collected and stored.
However, this approach entails potential usability problems. Since IP addresses
might change frequently in time [3], this can result in frequent re-authentication.
Hence, we do not consider this as a sensible RBA solution for practical use.
The Multi-Features Model extends the single-feature model. It derives
additional features from the IP address. These are evaluated together with addi-
tional features in a scoring model, which compares the current feature values with
the authentication history. Depending on the resulting risk score, multiple types
of actions are performed (e.g. sending security alerts or requesting additional au-
thentication factors). According to our observations this model was adopted by
Google and—in slightly more simplified form without security alerts—by Ama-
zon and LinkedIn. This model has the potential to increase usability compared
to the single-feature model since additional authentication factors can be re-
quested less frequently. However, attackers are possibly able to learn about the
RBA implementation based on detailed information delivered in security alerts.
The VIP Model protects only special users. Depending on the user’s status
(e.g. important or not important), RBA is active or inactive. We assume that
Facebook used this model. This procedure will make it harder for attackers to
gain information about the used RBA implementation. However, if such a mech-
anism is known, attackers are able to find out whether an account is considered
as important by the online service (which is the case when RBA is triggered).
Also, this model puts some users at risk since it does not protect all users.
5.2 Limitations
We were able obtain a high amount of information with the described studies.
However, the RBA behavior could only be determined from visible reactions
disclosed by the online services. Hence, we can only estimate internal weightings
for features. It is still possible that the real weightings might vary in detail. In
addition, RBA is required to be activated anytime for determining feature sets
accurately. It is still possible that online services (additionally) use other features
which were not tested in the studies (e.g. canvas fingerprinting).
Although we took a lot of care of not being detectable as an automated
user, we cannot fully exclude that the inspected online services identified our
identities as non-humans. Judging some of the hints we obtained during our
pilot phase, we are strongly convinced, though, that our investigations remained
under respective detecting thresholds.
5.3 Ethical Considerations
It is commonly found that tools and techniques used for security analysis are
“dual use”, i.e., can be used for illegitimate purposes as well. We believe our work
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is justified, as the expected security gain (from broader adoption of RBA) out-
weighs the expected security implications. Furthermore, we designed our study
to keep the potential impact on the server infrastructure minimal. Finally, we
followed the principle of responsible disclosure.
6 Conclusion
RBA is becoming more and more important to strengthen password-based au-
thentication without affecting the user interface at the same time. As RBA is
still in its infancy, it is of paramount importance that RBA approaches and
implementations are rigorously analyzed following common scientific policies.
Unfortunately, almost all early adopters of RBA restrain their approaches and
experiences, preventing the required scientific dialogue and the widespread adop-
tion. To close this information gap, we developed distinct studies enabling to
verify whether a particular online service adopted RBA. Moreover, we were able
to determine the underlying feature sets and requested authentication factors.
We can confirm the general trend in RBA of using the IP address as a high
weighted indicator to determine risks of login attempts. Some services also used
additional lower weighted indicators (e.g. user agent). Furthermore, verification
codes are currently the unwritten standard for additional RBA authentication
factors. Our research disclosed potential vulnerabilities and usability problems
on specific RBA implementations (one vulnerability was fixed after we contacted
the company in charge). Since RBA usually evaluates sensitive data, there is need
for more open research on this technology to mitigate such potential risks.
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